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Empirical studies of antidumping activity focus almost exclusively on the period since 1980. This
paper puts recent U.S. antidumping experience in historical context by studying the determinants
of annual case filings over the past half century. The conventional view that few antidumping cases
existed prior to 1980 is not correct, although most did not result in the imposition of duties. The
increased number of cases in recent decades largely reflects petitions that target multiple source
countries; the number of imported products involved has actually fallen since the mid 1980s. The
annual number of antidumping cases is influenced by the unemployment rate, the exchange rate,
import penetration (closely related to the decline in average tariffs), and changes in the antidumping







1  See Blonigen and Prusa (2003) for an excellent survey of the economic literature on
antidumping measures.
Introduction
Antidumping provisions have been a part of U.S. trade law for over eighty years, but
have been prominent only in the past two decades.  Antidumping was such an obscure part of
U.S. trade policy that there was virtually no economic research on the topic until the pioneering
paper of Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982).  Since then, research on antidumping policy has
focused almost exclusively on the period since 1980.
1  As a result, we know very little about the
use of antidumping laws prior to 1980 and the degree to which there has been a shift toward
more intensive use of antidumping remedies over time.  
The purpose of this paper is to put the recent U.S. antidumping experience in historical
perspective, focusing in particular on the period since World War II.  This perspective enables us
to answer several questions.  Is it true that few antidumping petitions were filed prior to 1980?  If
so, what explains that low level of antidumping activity, given that it is now considered to be an
“easy” way for import-competing firms to gain protection?  And what economic and political
factors explain the shift toward a more intensive use of antidumping remedies over time?  Only
by looking at the historical experience with antidumping can we shed light on these questions.  
An examination of the entire history of U.S. antidumping policy reveals the following:
• the number of antidumping investigations conducted in the late 1930s and the late
1950s and early 1960s is surprisingly large and comparable to the post-1980s levels of activity;
• most antidumping investigations prior to the 1970s were dismissed by the Treasury-3-
Department as lacking evidence of less-than-fair-value (LTFV) sales; by contrast, now virtually
all petitions move on to the injury determination stage of the process;
• the increase in antidumping cases since the early 1980s is related to the rise of multiple
petitions, i.e., petitions that cite several source countries of dumping the same product in the U.S.
market; in fact, the number of products targeted in antidumping cases has fallen since the mid-
1980s;
• the proximate determinants of the annual number of antidumping cases is the
unemployment rate, the exchange rate, import penetration, and a 1984 legal change that
encouraged the filing of multiple petitions.  
This paper first examines some of the legal and administrative changes in antidumping
policy since its inception.  The paper then performs the simple service of collecting and
presenting data on the annual number of antidumping investigations over time.  Finally, a simple
econometric model is used to examine the importance of various determinants of the annual
number of antidumping investigations.  
The Evolution of U.S. Antidumping Law
The precursors to U.S. antidumping legislation emerged in the late nineteenth century
from the antitrust movement and concerns about the role of unfair competition in fostering the
growth of monopolies.  The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 declared illegal any effort to
combine or conspire to monopolize a particular market.  The Clayton Act of 1914 made price
discrimination an illegal practice if it reduced competition or tended to create a monopoly.  
Legislation enacted shortly thereafter extended these principles to international trade. -4-
2  Viner (1923, p. 241) judges this part of the Wilson tariff to be “without practical
significance.”
3  Quoted in Congressional Budget Office (1994), p. 20.
4  The EU and Japan challenged the 1916 law as inconsistent with GATT 1994 since it
does not have a material injury test as required by the Uruguay Round’s Antidumping
Agreement.  In 2000, the WTO Appellate Body affirmed a panel ruling against the United States
on the matter.
The Wilson Tariff of 1894 made it unlawful for foreign producers to combine or conspire to
monopolize the U.S. market.
2  Similarly, the Antidumping Act of 1916 (part of the Revenue Act
of 1916) made it illegal to sell imported goods at prices substantially lower than the market value
in the exporting country “with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United
States, or of prevent the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.”
3  This 1916
antidumping law is a criminal statute with criminal punishments.  The remedy is not higher
import duties but rather fines (triple damages) and possible imprisonment for those found guilty. 
The law is rarely invoked because the exporter must be shown to have had “predatory intent”
with the aim of limiting or restraining competition and proving such intent is difficult for the
plaintiff.  The law is still on the books, but it was recently ruled as inconsistent with WTO
obligations.
4 
U.S. antidumping law as we currently know it really began with the Antidumping Act of
1921, part of the Emergency Tariff Act of that year.  According to this law, “Whenever the
Secretary of the Treasury finds that an industry in the United States is likely to be injured, or is
prevented from being established, by reason of the importation into the United States of foreign
merchandise, and that merchandise of such class or kind is being sold or is likely to be sold in-5-
5  Quoted in CBO (1994), p. 21.  Thus, the United State was slow to follow the example
of Canada, which enacted the first antidumping law in 1904.  It is ironic that Canada developed
antidumping laws to block steel imports from the United States (particularly from the U.S. Steel
Corporation) and now, a century later, the U.S. steel industry is among the major users of the law
to stop imports.
the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall make such finding public. . . .
[I]f the purchase price or the exporter’s sales price is less than the foreign market value (or, in
the absence of such value, than the cost of production), there shall be levied, collected, and paid
a special dumping duty in an amount equal to such difference.”
5
The Antidumping Act of 1921 contains all the elements of what we now recognize as
antidumping: that duties may be imposed if the exporter’s sales price is less than the foreign
market value, that foreign costs of production may be calculated if the foreign market value is
not ascertainable, that the dumping must be related to injury suffered by the domestic industry,
that higher import duties are the appropriate remedy, etc.  
The 1921 law differs markedly from the 1916 legislation.  The 1916 law focuses on the
intent of the exporter, whereas the 1921 law hinges on a finding of price discrimination and
injury.  The 1916 law is enforced in legal proceedings in the court system, whereas the 1921 law
is administrated by executive agencies.  In the 1916 law, dumping is related to some vague
notion of predatory pricing, but in the 1921 law dumping occurs simply if foreign firms charge
lower prices on products sold in the United States than in their home market, regardless of
whether predation is an issue.  The remedy in the 1916 law is fines and possible imprisonment,
whereas the remedy in the 1921 law is higher import duties (if injury to domestic producers is
found).  
Thus, the 1921 law set the stage for antidumping filings in a way that the 1916 law could-6-
6  The Tariff Commission helped enforce several different trade laws during this period. 
For example, Section 337 of Tariff Act of 1930 authorized the Tariff Commission to investigate
alleged unfair methods of competition relating to imports when the effect or tendency of such
methods or acts is to destroy or substantially injure a domestic industry, or to prevent the
establishment of an industry, or to restrain or monopolize the trade and commerce of the United
States.  Section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930 - the so-called flexible tariff provision - sets forth a
procedure under which an import duty could be changed by proclamation of the president after
an investigation and report by the Commission on the differences between the cost of production
in the United State and in its principal foreign supplier.  In addition, Section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of authorizes the president to restrict imports of a commodity that
render ineffective or interfere materially with U.S. agricultural programs (notably price
supports).  
not.  As Finger (1993, p. 24) notes: “Under the softer standard of interpretation and proof,
administration of the law could follow changing political pressures for protection much more
quickly than a more rigorous, rule-of-law standard would allow.  Thus it prepared the way for
the eventual emergence of antidumping as the main vehicle for import-competing interests to
press for protection – and for governments to respond to those pressures.”
Despite this, antidumping was not a critical component of U.S. trade policy during the
1920s and 1930s, nor in the period immediately following World War II.  U.S. import tariffs
were quite high through the 1920s and early 1930s and import penetration (measured by the ratio
of imports to GDP) was very low.  Although tariffs began to fall by the mid 1930s, due in part to
negotiations reached under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, domestic producers
could invoke various trade laws to obtain protection from foreign competition.
6  But antidumping
was not an easy avenue for obtaining import relief, as statistics discussed in the next section will
indicate. 
Yet policymakers did not forget about the antidumping law.  The United States was the
main proponent of including antidumping procedures in Article VI of the General Agreement on-7-
7  See Hansen and Prusa (1996).
Tariffs and Trade in 1947.  Indeed, the 1921 legislation formed the textual basis for Article VI. 
But Congress has been sensitive to any weakening of U.S. antidumping policy in multilateral
negotiations.  For example, the Kennedy Round negotiations in the 1960s arrived at an
antidumping code with a much more stringent definition of “material injury” than in U.S. law. 
Congress objected to the higher standard and passed a law stipulating that the United States
would abide by the code only so long as it did not conflict with existing U.S. law.
In the 1970s and 1980s, as demand for antidumping measures increased, Congress passed
legislation that changed various features of the antidumping law and made import duties a more
likely outcome of the process.  The Trade Act of 1974 expanded the definition of dumping to
include home market sales below the average cost of production.  The Trade Agreements Act of
1979 repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921 and the revised antidumping law was enacted as a
new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930.  This act shortened the time limits for antidumping
investigations and determinations and allowed the use of “best information available” in cases
where foreign firms did not provide information requested of them.  The Trade and Tariff Act of
1984 required that the International Trade Commission cumulate the imports of all countries
subject to an antidumping investigation when making an injury determination. This increased the
benefit to domestic firms of filing petitions targeting several different countries of dumping the
same product.
7 
In addition to these legal changes, Congress made two important administrative changes
to the antidumping process in 1954 and 1979.  (See Table 1.)  Originally, the Treasury
Department had full responsibility for determining if foreign merchandise had been imported at-8-
8  Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, FY 1953-54, p. 304.
9  Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives.  Report on the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.  House Report No. 317, 96
th Congress, 1
st Session.  July 1979, p. 24.
less than fair value (LTFV) and investigating whether the domestic industry was injured as a
result of such imports.  Effective October 1, 1954, Congress shifted the injury investigation from
Treasury to the U.S. Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission).  Since the
Tariff Commission routinely conducted such investigations in enforcing other trade laws, this
shift appears to have been motived mainly by issues of administrative expertise.  Treasury
Department officials supported this change, noting that injury determination was “completely
outside the ordinary scope of departmental activities.”
8
Effective January 1, 1980, the Carter Administration shifted the LTFV determination to
the Department of Commerce.  With Congress’s consent, this shift took place in part because of
the perceived indifference of Treasury to the plight of petitioning firms.  As a report of the
House Ways and Means Committee noted in 1979, “This Committee has long been dissatisfied
with the administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes by the Treasury
Department . . . . Given Treasury’s performance over the past 10 years, many have questioned
whether the dumping and countervail investigations and policy functions should remain in the
Treasury Department.”
9  In its report, the House (1979, pp. 6-7) committee noted (without
specifically naming the Treasury Department) that “past deficient administration of these laws”
were due to “low priority and inadequate staffing levels.”  The committee noted that the shift
“will give these functions high priority within a Department whose principle mission is trade.  In
the past agencies have arbitrarily set a course of administration of these statutes contrary to-9-
10  The House report also noted (p. 8), “One of the major criticism of moving
international trade functions to the Commerce Department has been the orientation of that
Department toward its domestic business constituency.  This perception may be true at this time;
if so, it is an orientation which the Department must change.  Too great protection of domestic
markets will effectively smother U.S. export potential, as other governments retaliate with their
own protectionist barriers against U.S. imports.”
congressional intent.”
10  
Thus, changes in the legal provisions of the antidumping law and in the administrative
enforcement of the law were designed to facilitate the filing of petitions and increase the
probability of import duties as being the final outcome.
Antidumping Activity over Time
As noted in the introduction, most economic research on U.S. antidumping policy has not
examined the pre-1980 experience.  The failure to study antidumping measures prior to 1980 is
due to the lack of readily available data from that period and the perception that antidumping
was not very important at that time.  As a result, economists have little sense for the overall trend
in U.S. antidumping activity prior to 1980.  
To shed some light on antidumping prior to 1980, Figure 1 presents the annual number of
antidumping cases filed since 1922.  (These data are presented and their sources described in the
Appendix.)   This figure reveals that antidumping cases were by no means nonexistent prior to
1980.  Indeed, antidumping filings were quite pronounced during the late 1930s, even rivaling
the large number of cases in the early 1980s and early 1990s.  In addition, there was a steady and
fairly substantial stream of cases from the mid 1950s until the mid 1960s. 
Figure 2 focuses on the post-World War II period, where greater case detail is available. -10-
This figure presents the total number of cases and the number of cases relating to a particular
imported product.  Each antidumping petition targets imports from a single country source.  Prior
to the early 1980s, most domestic industries filed a single petition that targeted imports of a
particular product from a particular country.  Since then, the number of multiple petitions has
increased significantly.  For example, of the 65 cases filed in FY 1991, six petitions concerned
carbon steel standard pipe, seven dealt with wire rope, nine related to coated ground wood paper,
fourteen addressed ball bearings, and so on.  Though there were 65 individual investigations in
this year, only 26 different imported commodities were the subject of scrutiny.  Indeed, the
surges in antidumping activity in 1992-94 and 1998-2001 are directly related to the multiple
petitions filed by the steel industry.
The increase in multiple petitions reflect several factors.  First, the number of countries
that supply the United States with a particular product has increased over the post-war period. 
To prevent the trade diversion that would occur if only one source of imports was affected by
antidumping duties, domestic petitioners have a growing incentive to file multiple petitions.  In
addition, as noted earlier, a legal change in 1984 requires the International Trade Commission to
cumulate imports from all petitions in making injury determinations.  This gives petitioning
firms an extra incentive to file multiple petitions to raise the probability of an affirmative injury
finding.  
As Figure 2 illustrates, after adjusting the total number of antidumping petitions for those
covering the same product, the number of products targeted by antidumping filings after 1980
does not appear to be significantly higher than in previous decades.  When looked at from the
perspective of the number of products targeted, antidumping seems to have peaked around 1985-11-
and to have declined since then.  The message of Figure 2 is therefore strikingly contrary to the
conventional view – antidumping may not be more important after 1980 than before.  
Of course, each antidumping action now may have a greater negative impact on trade
than in the past.  As Blonigen (2003) notes, antidumping margins have risen significantly since
the 1980s, so that the impact of antidumping duties on trade is greater.  Furthermore, the rise of
multiple petitions means that imports are more broadly shut out of the market when duties are
imposed.  While single petitions gave rise to substantial trade diversion, as countries not facing
the antidumping duties increased their exports significantly after the imposition of duties, such
diversion is less likely when multiple petitions are the norm.
Figure 3 plots the total number of cases and the number of cases in which an injury
determination (either affirmative or negative) was made.  An injury determination is required
before antidumping duties can be imposed.  As the figure illustrates, although many antidumping
cases were filed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, very few cases reached the injury
determination stage.  Of those that did, injury was not often found to exist.  Table 2 documents
this point by presenting the disposition of antidumping cases between 1934 and 1954.  During
that period, only 5 percent of all cases resulted in import duties.  In more than 80 percent of all
cases, a finding of no dumping was made, either because imports were not found to be priced at
LTFV, dumping margins were minimal, or petitions were withdrawn.  As a result, no injury
ruling by the Treasury was required.  Only a quarter of the remaining cases (five percent of all
cases) was there an affirmative injury finding.  
The dearth of injury rulings began to change in the early 1970s and, by the mid-1980s,
virtually every case filed received an injury determination one way or the other.  Figure 4-12-
illustrates this development and shows that, since the late 1970s, roughly half of all ITC injury
determinations are affirmative.
In conclusion, the number of antidumping investigations is clearly greater after 1980 than
before, largely because of the increased propensity of firms to file multiple petitions.  The
number of imported products targeted for antidumping action has been remarkably stable over
time.  In addition, since the late 1970s, almost every case reaches the injury determination stage.  
Determinants of Antidumping Cases Filed 
None of the existing studies of the determinants of aggregate U.S. antidumping activity –
notably Feinberg (1989), Leidy (1997), and Knetter and Prusa (2003) – examine the pre-1980
period.  Therefore, the data described above can be used to explore some of the economic and
political factors accounting for the rise in antidumping actions since the end of World War II.  
Knetter and Prusa (2003) focus on two primary determinants of the annual number of
antidumping cases – the change in real GDP and the real exchange rate.  They find that an
appreciation of the real exchange rate (with a one year lag) leads to an increase in the number of
antidumping petitions filed.  Although a decline in real GDP leads to an increase in filings, the
change in real GDP (with a three year lag) is not a statistically significant determinant of
antidumping filings when steel cases are excluded.  
Exchange rates and business cycles might also explain the lower level of antidumping
activity during the 1950s and 1960s.  During that period, the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates ensured that real exchange rate movements were minimal.  In addition, business
cycle fluctuations were relatively mild.  Starting in the early 1970s, exchange rate variability-13-
11  Irwin (1998) examines how the combined impact of changing tariff rates and
fluctuations in import prices has affected the average U.S. tariff over time.
increased and the U.S. economy experienced some severe business cycle downturns.  The rise in
the use of antidumping remedies coincides with these economic changes. 
From a longer term perspective, at least two other factors could also account for the rise
in antidumping activity over the postwar period – the increased role of import competition in the
U.S. economy, and legal and administrative changes in antidumping policy. 
First, the exposure of American industries to import competition clearly increased over
the post-war period.  Figure 5 shows that the ratio of merchandise imports to GDP starts to rise
in the late 1960s.  The import/GDP ratio increased from about 3 percent of GDP in the 1950s and
1960s to about 8 percent in the 1980s and reached more than 10 percent by the end of the 1990s. 
This rise in import penetration is plausibly related to the decline in the average tariff on
dutiable imports.  The average tariff fell quite sharply in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to
the reduction in tariff rates as a result of the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations
and the impact of higher import prices on the ad valorem equivalent of the many specific duties
in the tariff code.
11  The timing of the decline in tariffs on dutiable imports and the rise in import
penetration is quite striking.  The correlation between these two series is -0.94.  This decline in
trade barriers exposed many industries to foreign competition and may have pushed them toward
using antidumping duties to protect themselves.  
A second factor that could account for the rise in antidumping activity is institutional
changes in the administration of the antidumping law.  As reported earlier, various subtle
changes in the legal requirements for antidumping relief in 1974, 1980, and 1984, may have-14-
12  The data are from the website of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis (www.bea.gov). 
increased the number of antidumping complaints by raising the probability of obtaining import
relief.  In addition, in 1980 the Commerce Department replaced the Treasury Department as the
institution responsible for LTFV determinations.  The shift took place because Treasury was
perceived to be relatively indifferent to antidumping petitions, whereas Commerce was expected
to be a more sympathetic advocate for domestic firms seeking protection.  Simply changing the
agency responsible for handling the complaints may have constituted a regime shift that
increased the number of petitions.  
The relative importance of these potential determinants of antidumping activity can be
sorted out by regressing the annual number of antidumping cases on various independent
variables.  Following the work of Knetter and Prusa (2003), two macroeconomic determinants of
antidumping filings are the change in the log of real GDP and the log of the foreign exchange
value of the dollar.  The first measures the rate of U.S. economic growth;  previous studies have
found that the number of antidumping petitions increases during a recession and decrease during
an expansion, although the relationship has been found to be weak.
12  The unemployment rate is
an alternative variable that will be used as well.  
The exchange rate used here is the nominal effective U.S. dollar exchange rate from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  The real exchange rate has been used in other studies,
but it is available from the IMF and other authorities only since 1975.  As is well known,
however, movements in nominal exchange rates are closely related to movements in real
exchange rates; indeed, for the period 1975 to 2002 the correlation between the nominal and real-15-
13  The import/GDP data is from the BEA.  The average tariff figures are from the
Department of Commerce’s Historical Statistics of the United States, updated by the U.S.
International Trade Commission.
14  See Cameron and Trivedi (1998).  A more sophisticated approach would take into
account the possibility of serial correlation in the regression.  
effective exchange rate of the dollar is 0.90.  
In addition, the regressions will use measures of import competition – the merchandise
import to GDP ratio and the average tariff – and a dummy variable to capture administrative
changes.
13  Both are exogenous variables from the standpoint of any individual industry that is
considering appealing to the government for protection.  Finally, dummy variables taking the
value of one for the periods after 1974, 1979, and 1984 will represent the effects of legal and
administrative changes on the number of filings.  Strictly speaking, the dummy variables capture
any omitted factors after these years that would increase antidumping filings, but the variables
are plausibly linked to legal and administrative changes at that time.
Table 3 presents some econometric results ion which the dependent variable is simply the
number of cases filed in any given fiscal year.  Since the dependent variable is a count measure,
the models are estimated by a negative binomial regression.
14  From column (1), using the main
variables employed by Knetter and Prusa (2003), it appears that changes in GDP and the
exchange rate are not systematically related to the annual number of filings over the longer time-
period considered here.  However, as column (2) shows, the unemployment rate, rather than the
change in real GDP, appears to be more precisely related to the number of antidumping petitions. 
A higher unemployment rate is related to more antidumping cases.  
Column (3) shows that the results improve when import penetration (measured by the-16-
import to GDP ratio) is included with the macroeconomic determinants.  Not surprisingly, a rise
in import penetration increases the number of antidumping filings.  The coefficient on the
exchange rate reverses its sign from the previous column and becomes statistically significant. 
As expected, an appreciation in the foreign exchange value of the dollar leads to more
antidumping filings.  Column (4) shows that the results do not change substantially with the
substitution of the average tariff on dutiable imports for import penetration, although the
coefficient on unemployment is estimated less precisely. 
Column (5) includes three dummy variables for the years starting in 1975, 1980, and
1985, to represent the impact of the 1974 and 1984 legal changes and the 1980 shift of
antidumping responsibilities to the Commerce Department.  These dummy variables reduce the
impact of import penetration, but do not change the effect of unemployment or the exchange rate
on antidumping cases.  However, the only dummy variable that is positive and statistically
significant is that for the 1984 legal change which gave firms the incentive to file multiple
petitions.  Taking the exponential of the coefficient on the dummy variable indicates that the
conditional mean of the number of cases is 2.12 times higher after 1984.  This implies a
substantial effect: a 112 percent increase translates into an additional 22 cases per year from pre
1984 levels. 
To facilitate a comparison of the importance of each of these factors, the next column
reports coefficients on the standardized variables.  The effects of the unemployment rate, the
exchange rate, and import penetration are roughly comparable: a one standard deviation increase
in the exchange rate leads to about a 0.23 standard deviation increase in the number of filings. 
Thus, there is a rough symmetry between comparably sized changes in these variables in terms-17-
15  Hansen and Prusa (1997) investigate the political and economic factors behind
whether the ITC renders an affirmative or a negative injury finding.
of their impact on the number of antidumping cases. 
Table 4 considers two different dependent variables, the annual number of products
covered in antidumping cases (i.e., multiple petitions concerning a single product become one
observation) and the number of injury determinations (both affirmative and negative).  As in the
previous table, the unemployment rate, the exchange rate, the import penetration ratio, and the
1984 legal change all appear to be important determinants of the number of products which are
involved in antidumping cases (column 1).  In explaining the declining number of products
targeted after the mid-1980s, the impact of the drop in the unemployment rate and the lower
foreign exchange value of the dollar must have dominated the continued rise in import
penetration and the 1984 legal change.  
The results in column (2) indicate that the same factors are at work in explaining the
number of cases that receive an injury determination.
15  In this case, the coefficient on the 1984
legal change is more than double that in the previous column.  This indicates that the cumulation
requirement appears to have had an impact on the number of cases getting to the injury stage.
Several conclusions cut across these findings.  Changes in real GDP do not appear to be
systematically related to antidumping activity.  This suggests that the industry-specific cycles
that trigger antidumping demands are not necessarily correlated with the economy-wide business
cycle.  (The difficulties faced by the steel industry after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, for
example, coincided with robust economic growth in the United States.)  Rather, the two
macroeconomic phenomena that drive antidumping activity are the unemployment rate-18-
16  This substitution is to be expected and perhaps even welcomed.  Fischer and Prusa
(2003) argue that contingent protection dominates high average protection as a mechanism for
insuring import-competing firms and their workers from import shocks.  So from a welfare
perspective, sector-specific contingent protection measures are superior to uniform non-
contingent tariffs. 
(positively related) and the exchange rate (appreciations being positively related).  In addition,
the increasing role of imports in the economy – related to the decline in average levels of
protection – is also positively related to the number of antidumping filings.
16  
Finally, as the dummy variable indicates, something clearly happened to the level of
antidumping activity after 1984.  In that year, the Congress changed the antidumping law to
require the ITC to cumulate the impact of all imports from countries against whom a petition had
been filed in rendering its injury decision.  This gave import-competing firms an incentive to file
more antidumping petitions against other countries for a given product.  The effect could also
represent the lagged impact of a major institutional change – the shift in administrative
responsibility from Treasury to Commerce.  The Commerce Department was much more apt to
find LTFV sales, leading to many more petitions filed and injury determinations made.  Thus,
empirical results that focus exclusively on the period after 1979 may fail to capture the
importance of legal changes and bureaucratic incentives in giving rise to additional antidumping
activity. 
Conclusion
This paper has put recent U.S. antidumping experience in historical perspective by
studying the number of AD cases prior to the 1980s.  Contrary to the conventional view, many
antidumping petitions had been filed in previous decades, particularly in the late 1950s and early-19-
1960s and again in the early 1970s.  Unlike today, however, most of these petitions did not result
in the imposition of antidumping duties.  The greater number of petitions in recent years reflects
the tendency of firms to file multiple petitions, while the number of products targeted for
antidumping measures has actually declined since the early 1980s.
In terms of the empirical results, the annual number of antidumping investigations is
affected by two macroeconomic factors – unemployment and the exchange rate.  In addition, the
trend toward greater import penetration in the U.S. economy dating from the early 1970s (a
factor that is highly correlated with declining average tariffs) and legal and administrative
change in antidumping policy have also had an impact on the number of antidumping cases. -20-
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Appendix:
Annual Number of Antidumping Cases, Products, and Injury Determinations, by fiscal year.
Injury Determinations
AD Filings Products Affirmative Negative
1947 1 1 0 0
1948 3 2 0 0
1949 13 10 0 5
1950 15 14 0 3
1951 6 5 0 0
1952 5 5 0 1
1953 9 6 0 8
1954 14 3 0 4
1955 15 12 1 5
1956 18 10 0 1
1957 41 28 0 2
1958 13 7 0 2
1959 45 35 0 2
1960 33 15 1 3
1961 32 20 3 4
1962 16 8 0 2
1963 42 29 1 5
1964 27 17 3 8
1965 22 20 1 2
1966 16 13 1 2
1967 9 4 2 0
1968 13 10 4 1
1969 21 18 7 2
1970 23 9 15 1
1971 22 21 7 7
1972 39 34 10 13
1973 27 25 9 10
1974 10 10 2 4
1975 14 10 2 4
1976 22 18 1 9
1977 19 3 9 6
1978 47 37 7 8
1979 41 28 11 7
1980 16 20 9 15
1981 14 13 4 5
1982 35 27 12 25
1983 46 20 12 14
1984 38 36 16 13
1985 69 42 26 20
1986 83 23 37 14
1987 16 20 17 15-23-
1988 42 15 21 14
1989 24 17 17 9
1990 35 13 15 4
1991 66 26 19 40
1992 84 25 38 47
1993 37 16 11 9
1994 51 22 29 26
1995 14 12 9 6
1996 21 11 9 2
1997 15 8 14 7
1998 36 9 22 11
1999 46 16 20 24
2000 45 12 18 15
2001 77 24 40 43
2002 35 14 12 21
Note on Sources:  There is no consolidated and reliable source for early antidumping cases. 
Several sources were used in the construction of this time series.  For the period 1922 to 1953,
the source is http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/pre80ad.txt.  This source is poorly documented.  A more
reliable and complete compilation of all cases prior to 1953 might be available by going through
the Treasury’s publication Treasury Decisions.  For the period from 1953 to 1979 (fiscal years),
the number of cases filed is reported in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. 
After these data were compiled, I discovered that Baldwin (1998, p. 302) presents the same data
for essentially the same period.  For fiscal years 1980 to 2002, the source is an internal document
from the Office of Investigations, International Trade Commission. -24-
Table 1: Administrative Responsibilities in Antidumping Policy
Dumping Determination Injury Determination
1921 - 1954 Treasury Department Treasury Department
1954 - 1979 Treasury Department Tariff Commission
1979 - present Commerce Department International Trade Commission
Note: The Tariff Commission was re-named the International Trade Commission in 1974.
Table 2: Outcomes of Antidumping Cases, 1934-1954
Number of Cases Percentage
Distribution
Total Cases 146 100
No Basis for Finding under AD Law 139 95
No Sales at LTFV 90 62
De minimis, complaint withdrawn, etc. 28 19
No Injury 21 14
Findings under Antidumping Act 7 5
Source: Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (1957), p. 15. -25-
Table 3: Determinants of Antidumping Cases, FY 1947-2002
Dependent Variable: Annual Number of Antidumping Cases  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Standardized
Coefficients
) Log of GDP (-1)  -0.43
(4.47)
-- -- -- -- --






























Log of Average Tariff (Dutiable Imports) -- -- -- -1.24*
(0.27)
-- --
Dummy Variable (starting 1975) -- -- -- -- -0.30
(0.62)
--
Dummy Variable (starting 1980) -- -- -- -- -0.20
(0.39)
--





2 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57
Log Likelihood -235.0 -234.4 -226.3 -225.4 -222.8 -223.1
Note:  Estimated by a negative binomial regression.  Robust standard errors are reported. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.-26-


































Log Likelihood -192.8 -183.7
Note:  Estimated by a negative binomial regression.  Robust standard errors are reported. 





























Figure 1: Annual Number of Antidumping Cases, FY 1922-2002 
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Figure 2: Antidumping Cases, FY 1947-2002
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Figure 3: Number of Antidumping Cases and Injury Determinations, FY 1947 - 2002
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Figure 4: Antidumping Injury Determinations, FY 1947-2002
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Figure 5: Average Tariffs and Import Penetration, 1947 - 2002